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rence of a future event. For the same reason an interest in property, other
than an undivided interest, is subject to a condition precedent when the
identity of the property depends upon the occurrence of a future event In
the Braun case there is no gift of an undivided interest in specific property
to the trustee for the marital trust. The selection by the executor of specific
items of the testator's property to be held by the trustee under the marital
trust is a condition precedent to the vesting of the legal tide to this prop-
erty in the trustee. Although the executor's selection of the property is a
condition precedent under general rules of construction, the Ohio Supreme
Court could determine that, for the purposes of the Rule against Perpetui-
ties, the trustee of the marital trust received a "vested" interest at the testa-
tor's death.
However, the trust can be sustained in a more logical way and therefore
the meaning of the word "vest" should not be unnecessarily distorted. An
accepted modern policy of construction is not to defeat the testator's intent
but, if possible, to construe his language so as to avoid the Rule against
Perpetuities.' It would, therefore, be proper for a court to hold that the
testator's executor must select the property for the marital trust within the
period allowed by law for making the federal estate tax returns which is
considerably less than the period of twenty-one years after the testator's
death within which the vesting or nonvesting of an interest must be de-
termined under the Rule against Perpetuities.10 The common pleas court
in the Braust case recognized the validity of this reasoning,"L but elected to
call the interest of the trustee vested as of testator's death.
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INSURANCE
In the cases reported during the past year, the courts of Ohio considered
once more the question of who may carry on the insurance business. In
Motors Insurance Corp. v. Robnsoni the plaintiff insurance company and
certain of its agents sued to enjoin the defendant from refusing to grant,
refusing to renew and revoking licenses to the appointees of the insurance
company. Ohio has long required that only persons engaged in a general
insurance business could be licensed as agents. Sections 644 and 644-3 of
I BOGERT, TRUSTs AND TRUSTEES § 111 (1951).
9 AM. LAw OF PROPERTY § 24.45 (1952); 3 PAGE, WLLLs 695 (1941); RESTATE-
MENT, PROPERTY § 243, comment n, § 375 (1950)
'0For discussion of comparable cases see 6 Am. LAw OF PROPERTY § 24.23 (1952).
'Braun v. Central Trust Co., 104 N.E.2d 480, 485 (Hamilton Com. PL 1951)
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the Ohio General Code allow the Superintendent of Insurance to prevent
agents from being licensed if the agent intends to place insurance prin-
cipally on property of which he or his employers or employees are "agent,
custodian, vendor, bailee, trustee or payee." In the present case the insur-
ance company habitually designated automobile dealers or their salesmen
as appointees. The insurance company, concerned primarily with the word
"vendor," contended that the restriction "could refer only to the time that
the named persons held the property either actually or theoretically and that
as soon as the property was sold and the property belonged to the purchaser,
the restriction no longer applied."2 However, the court held that "The pur-
pose of the restriction was undoubtedly intended to prevent an unfair ad-
vantage in the placing of insurance and the licensing of persons who are not
intending to do a general insurance business but simply to supplement their
primary business of selling automobiles." Consequently, an automobile
dealer or salesman is left free to sell insurance as a general matter, but in a
specific case the Superintendent of Insurance is to determine whether or
not he is selling principally on property of which he or his employer or
employee is the "vendor." The court further held that there was nothing
unconstitutional in such a restriction. The opimon in the common pleas
court was adopted by the court of appeals4 and the Supreme Court of Ohio
dismissed an appeal.5
In Hirschfelt v. Kentucky Central Life & Accident Insurance Co.,6 a life
insurance policy provided: 'No indemnity will be paid for accidental
death resulting from fatal or nonfatal injuries intentionally in-
flicted." The insured was beaten by two men and subsequently died from the
injuries inflicted. Other than a possible inference from the brutality of the
attack, there was no evidence that the aggressors intended to kill. The court
held that, because the provision was an exception, the insurance company had
the burden of proving as an affirmative defense that the injuries were in-
tentionally inflicted; but, since the "policy does not require evidence of an
intent to inflict a fatal injury,"7 the defense was established.
Royer v. Shawnee Mutual Insurance Co.8 involved the construction of a
personal injury and property damage policy covering operation of an auto-
1106 N.E.2d 572 (Franklin Corn. PL), aff'd, 106 N.E.2d 581 (Ohio App. 1951),
appeal dismissed, 157 Ohio St. 354, 105 N.E.2d 61 (1952). For a further discus-
sion of the case see the QRInNAL LAw article, supra.
'Id. at 577.
2 Id. at 579.
'62 Ohio L. Abs. 72, 106 N.E.2d 581 (Ohio App. 1951).
157 Ohio St. 354, 105 N.E.2d 61 (1952).
890 Olo App. 144, 103 N.E.2d 839 (1951).
'Id. at 147, 103 N.E.2d at 841.
891 Ohio App. 356, 106 N.E.2d 784 (1950).
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mobile. The automobile specified in the policy was in the garage for re-
pair. The insured purchased a second car to use in the meantime and with
it had the accident involved in the present litigation. The policy provided
that coverage included an automobile other than that specified in the
policy if the second car "replaced" the specified automobile. It was held
in a suit to recover for damage to the second automobile that a car laid up
in a garage does not serve the owner's purpose. The second one then serves
that purpose and "replaces" the first even though ownership to the first is
retained.
In Neff v. Massachusetts Mutual Life Insurance Co.,9 a life policy, in
which a wife was insured, provided that the proceeds were to be retained
by the company and the interest paid to the husband, if living; and, on the
death of the survivor of the husband and wife, the remaining amount was
to go to the children. The husband murdered the wife and was sentenced
to life imprisonment. The suit, although nominally against the insurance
company, is actually between the administrator of the wife's estate and the
guardian of the children. The court recognized the familiar principle that
a murdering beneficiary cannot take. As the alternative joint-beneficiaries,
the children are in no way tainted with the crime and will take under the
policy. However, since their right to take will mature only when both the
husband and wife are deceased and since Ohio does not recognize civil
death, they cannot take as long as the husband is alive.
The condition of health of the insured when the policy is initiated came
before the courts of Ohio for consideration. In Sambles v. Metropolitan
Life Insurance Co.'0 the insured applied for insurance and died four months
later of a coronary condition. During the two-year period prior to his
death, he had made eleven visits to a doctor, but when applying for the
insurance he represented that he had not visited a doctor in five years and
that his last serious illness was twenty-nine years earlier. When sued by
the beneficiary, the insurance company contended that it was entitled to
judgment as a matter of law. However, the trial court rendered judgment
on a verdict for the plaintiff. The Ohio Supreme Court, after referring to
Ohio General Code Section 9391, stated that "reasonable minds could only
conclude that the answers of the insured in his application were material
and induced the defendant to issue the policy and that but for such answers
the policy would not have been issued."'1 Furthermore, the court held that
it would be unreasonable to infer that the insured did not know that he had
a serious ailment in light of his regular visits to the doctor. Final judgment
'158 Ohio St. 45, 107 N.E.2d 100 (1952).
10158 Ohio St. 233, 108 N.E.2d 321 (1952).
Old. at 238, 108 NE.2d at 323.
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was given as requested by the defendant. In another case involving mis-
representation, Burpo v. Resolute Fire Insurance Co.:2 the court recog-
razed that misrepresentation of ownership in an automobile liability policy
would prevent the policy from becoming effective.
In Dams v. Prudental Insurance Co.,"s although the policy requirement
of "due proof" in notifying the company of death was held to mean "only
prima facie evidence," the mere reference to "hemorrhage" was held insuf-
ficient to inform the company of death by "accidental means."
The attempt of two insurance companies to adjust their interest in com-
monly insured property led to the decision in Aetna Casualty & Surety Co.
v. Buckeye Union Casualty Co.'4 The plaintiff company had granted one
Butler automobile liability insurance. The policy provided that it would
be "excess insurance over any other valid and collectible insurance" and also
provided for subrogation. Butler borrowed an automobile from the Motor
Co. while his own was being repaired. The Motor Co. was protected by
a blanket liability policy issued by the defendant company which was broad
enough to cover Butler in his use of the borrowed car. Butler had an acci-
dent for which he was liable. Both insurance companies were fully in-
formed as events progressed. The defendant disdaimed liability and the
plaintiff paid. The plaintiff sued daiming to be secondarily liable. The
defendant contended that the plaintiff had acted as a volunteer in paying.
The supreme court held that the plaintiff could not abandon its insured
just because the defendant chose to "deny liability and gamble on future
exoneration. '15 The defendant can not be "immunized from payment by
its own breach of contract."'16 The plaintiff had an interest to protect and
was not a volunteer. It may recover from the defendant which is primarily
liable for the loss.'7
The problem of cooperation by an insured under a liability policy was
involved in Ermakora v. Daillakzs.'8 The plaintiff in that case was injured
by the defendant in an automobile accident. In a telephone conversation
with the plaintiff's attorney, a person, supposedly the defendant, gave a
false address and promised to call on the attorney. Instead the defendant
left town. Following an unsatisfied judgment against the defendant, the
'90 Ohio App. 492, 107 N.E.2d 227 (1951).
" 61 Ohio L. Abs. 15, 102 N.E.2d 602 (Ohio App. 1951).
" 157 Ohio St. 385, 105 N.E.2d 568 (1952), versing, 62 Ohlo L. Abs. 202, 106
N.E.2d 589 (Ohio App. 1951).
'Id. at 391, 105 N.E.2d at 571.
"Id. at 392, 105 N.E.2d at 571.
'It should be noted that the court distingmshes the present case from Mutual Auto-
mobile Ins. Co. v. Buckeye Union Cas. Co., 147 Ohio St. 79, 67 N.B.2d 906 (1946).
is90 Ohio App. 453, 107 N.E.2d 392 (1951).
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